Notes on Information-Theoretic Privacy by Asoodeh, Shahab et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
51
0.
02
31
8v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  8
 O
ct 
20
15
1
Notes on Information-Theoretic Privacy
Shahab Asoodeh, Fady Alajaji, and Tamás Linder
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Queen’s University
{asoodehshahab, fady, linder}@mast.queensu.ca
Abstract
We investigate the tradeoff between privacy and utility in a situation where both privacy and utility are
measured in terms of mutual information. For the binary case, we fully characterize this tradeoff in case of
perfect privacy and also give an upper-bound for the case where some privacy leakage is allowed. We then
introduce a new quantity which quantifies the amount of private information contained in the observable data
and then connect it to the optimal tradeoff between privacy and utility.
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose Alice has some personal information which is represented by random variable X and she
wants to keep this personal information as private as possible. However there exists some correlated
information, represented by Y , observable by an advertising company and to be displayed publicly by
this company. The company gets paid to send the most information about Y , and at the same time it
does not want to violate the privacy of Alice. The question raised in this situation is then how much
information about Y can be displayed without breaching privacy? Hence, it is of interest to characterize
such competing objectives in the form of a quantitative tradeoff. Such a characterization provides a
controllable balance between utility and privacy.
Statistical studies regarding privacy were started by Warner [1] who suggested privacy-preserving
methods for survey sampling. More recently, a measure known as differential privacy was introduced
by Dwork et al. [2]. In this setting, usually the source is modelled as a database X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) ∈
Dn where D = {0, 1}ℓ. A mechanism M : Dn → S, where S is a set not necessarily equal to Dn, then
produces the sanitized database based on the tradeoff between accuracy and privacy. The accuracy of
differential privacy is defined via a query q : S → R where R is some abstract set. The query can be
viewed as a question about the original database X that one might ask. Each query is then answered
using the sanitized database Z. On the one hand, the data provider wants to have an accurate answer
to each query, and on the other hand, the provider needs to satisfy a certain level of privacy.
In an information-theoretic context, M is simply a Markov kernel (i.e., channel) Qn(·|X) with output
Z :=M(X) which takes values in S. The privacy is then measured by the upper-bound of the likelihood
ratio of x and x′ with Hamming distance 1, that is, the mechanism is called ǫ-differentially private if
Qn(B|x)
Qn(B|x′)
≤ exp(ǫ) for all measurable B ⊂ S and all x, x′ ∈ Dn such that dH(x, x′) = 1, where dH
is the Hamming distance. Note that this definition does not involve the prior distribution of x and x′.
Another measure of privacy was recently proposed under the name of a posteriori differential privacy
which incorporates the prior distributions by Wang et al. [3].
The locality requirement of dH(x, x′) = 1 in the definition makes it hard to connect differential privacy
to information theory. To overcome this problem, Duchi et al. [4] removed the condition dH(x, x′) = 1.
This generalized definition yields the upper bound I(X,Z) ≤ ǫ on the mutual information, which gives
an information-theoretic interpretation of differential privacy. Hence generalized ǫ-differentially private
mechanism leaks at most ǫ private information.
Despite its frequent use in computer science, differential privacy does not characterize the optimal
balance between privacy versus accuracy. For example, if we want only 1% privacy leakage, it is not
clear what the best achievable accuracy is. Furthermore, it is not clear how to define differential privacy
when instead of the database X , another database Y , correlated with X , is observable.
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2The problem treated in this paper can also be contrasted with the more well-studied concept of
secrecy. While in secrecy problems, e.g., in cryptography, wiretap channel problems, etc., the aim is to
keep information secret only from wiretappers, the problem treated in privacy further aims to keep the
correlated source private from the intended receiver.
Although there has been no universal way of measuring privacy in the literature, in this work we
follow Yamamoto [5] who proposed a private source coding model. He introduced the equivocation as
the conditional entropy of the private message given the observation and then defined the privacy in the
system as the equivocation involved in the decoding. He then defined the rate-distortion-equivocation
function as the tradeoff between utility (i.e., distortion) and privacy (i.e, equivocation). Inspired by this
work, we use the mutual information between private information X and the displayed information
Z as the measure of privacy and also use the mutual information between the observable data Y and
Z as utility and then define the rate-privacy function as the optimal tradeoff between these quantities.
Defining utility and privacy using the mutual information gives a more intuitive measure of how much
the receiver knows about Y and how much of the private information is leaked to the receiver.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we formulate the problem in terms of the rate-privacy
function and also study the binary case. We show that if zero privacy leakage is required, then in the
binary case, no information from Y can be transmitted. In section III we give a multi-letter version of
the rate-privacy function in a special case and show that even if n different copies of Y are observed,
non-zero information can be transmitted about Y when vanishing privacy leakage is required. In section
IV, we define a new quantity related with privacy and pose an intuitive question connecting the new
quantity with the rate-privacy function for the case of zero privacy leakage.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND THE RATE-PRIVACY FUNCTION
Consider two random variables X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y with |X |, |Y|<∞ and fixed joint distribution
PXY . X is the private data and Y is the observable data correlated with X . Suppose there exists a
channel PZ|Y such that Z, the displayed data, has limited information about X . This channel is called
the privacy filter. The objective is then to find the most informative privacy filter, i.e., a channel which
preserves most of the information contained in Y . This setup is shown in Fig. 1. In particular, we are
X Y Z
Fixed channel (imposed by nature) Privacy filter
Fig. 1. Information-theoretic privacy.
interested in characterizing the quantity,
gǫ(X ; Y ) := max
PZ|Y :I(X;Z)≤ǫ
I(Y ;Z), (1)
which we call, the rate-privacy function. The dual representation of gǫ(X ; Y ) is given in [6] and called
the privacy funnel. Basically, in this model, the privacy and utility are both measured using mutual
information. Note that since I(Y ;Z) is a convex function of PZ|Y and furthermore the constraint set
Dǫ := {PZ|Y : I(X ;Z) ≤ ǫ} is convex and compact, the maximum in (1) occurs at the extreme points,
namely for a PZ|Y ∈ Dǫ such that I(X ;Z) = ǫ. If we restrict PZ|Y to be a deterministic function f , we
get the simplified quantity
g˜ǫ(X ; Y ) := sup
f :I(f(Y );X)=ǫ
H(f(Y )). (2)
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3Using the Carathéodory-Fenchel theorem, one can readily show that it suffices that the random variable
Z is supported on an alphabet Z with cardinality |Z| ≤ |Y|+ 1.
In the study of gǫ(X ; Y ) for general PXY , the most interesting case is when ǫ = 0 (the so-called
prefect privacy), i.e., no privacy leakage is allowed. The following theorem shows that for binary X and
Y and an arbitrary channel between X and Y the requirement of perfect privacy allows no information
transfer from Y .
Theorem 1. For any pair of dependent binary random variables X and Y , we have
g0(X ; Y ) = 0.
Proof. In the perfect privacy regime the constraint set reduces to D0 = {PZ|Y : Z⊥⊥X}. Since X , Y
and Z form the Markov chain X → Y → Z, we can write
PZ|Y (·|0)PY |X(0|1) + PZ|Y (·|1)PY |X(1|1) = PZ|X(·|1)
PZ|Y (·|0)PY |X(0|0) + PZ|Y (·|1)PY |X(1|0) = PZ|X(·|0).
The condition Z⊥⊥X implies that PZ|X(·|1) = PZ|X(·|0) = PZ(·) and hence from the above,
PZ|Y (·|0)PY |X(0|1) + PZ|Y (·|1)PY |X(1|1) = PZ(·)
PZ|Y (·|0)PY |X(0|0) + PZ|Y (·|1)PY |X(1|0) = PZ(·).
From the assumption that X and Y are dependent, it follows that the above system of equations has a
unique solution. The unique solution turns out to satisfy PZ|Y (·|0) = PZ|Y (·|1) = PZ(·), which implies
that I(Y ;Z) = 0.
Note that the theorem does not necessarily hold for non-binary X and Y . In fact, it is easy to construct
an example for ternary Y and binary X in which g0(X ; Y ) > 0 (for instance, see Example 1). Berger
and Yeung [7, Appendix II], gave a necessary condition for g0(X ; Y ) > 0, in a different context.
Definition 1 ( [7]). The random variable X is said to be weakly independent of Y if the rows of the
transition matrix PX|Y , i.e., the set of vectors {PX|Y (·|y), y ∈ Y}, are linearly dependent.
In [7], it is proved that if X is weakly independent of Y then there exists a binary random variable
Z such that Z⊥⊥X which is correlated with Y , and hence g0(X ; Y ) > 0. This condition is met, for
example, if |Y| > |X |. It is also straightforward to show that this condition is indeed a necessary and
sufficient for g0(X ; Y ) > 0. It is straightforward to see that if Y is binary then X is weakly independent
of Y if and only if X and Y are independent. This together with the fact that weak independence is
a necessary and sufficient condition for g0(X ; Y ) > 0, imply the following lemma which generalizes
Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. Let Y be a binary random variable. Then g0(X ; Y ) is equal to either H(Y ) or zero.
III. A MULTI-LETTER VERSION OF g˜ǫ(X ; Y )
We next consider the simplified version of the rate-privacy function g˜ǫ(X ; Y ) defined in (2), in the
limit when ǫ → 0. Suppose for any x ∈ X , inducing the distribution PY |X(·|x) over Y , one takes n
independent copies of Y with distribution PY n|X(yn|x) =
∏n
i=1 PY |X(yi|x). The privacy constraint is
that; I(f(Y n);X) = ǫ for every n and every deterministic function f : Yn → Z where |Z| ≤ |Y|. Let
g˜n,ǫ(X ; Y ) denote 1n g˜ǫ(X ; Y
n) when the distribution PY n|X is specified as above, so that
g˜n,ǫ(X ; Y ) :=
1
n
sup
f : I(f(Y n);X)=ǫ
H(f(Y n)). (3)
The following theorem gives an asymptotic lower bound on g˜n,ǫ(X ; Y ).
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4Theorem 2. For any pair of random variables (X, Y ) with fixed joint distribution PXY , we have
lim
ǫ→0
lim
n→∞
1
n
g˜n,ǫ(X ; Y ) ≥ H
∗
∞(Y |X),
where the min-entropy is defined as
H∗∞(Y |X) := min
x∈X
min
y∈Y
(
− logPY |X(y|x)
)
. (4)
Proof. Suppose |X | = m and each xj ∈ X , j = 1, . . . , m, induces the product distribution P nj (yn) :=
PY n|X(y
n|xj) =
∏n
k=1 PY |X(yk|xj) over Y . Given these m distributions P nj for j = 1, 2, . . . , m, we
construct nearly equiprobable bins Knj (i) ⊂ Yn for i = 1, 2, . . . , 2r, (with r to be determined later),
such that P nj (Knj (i)) := P nj (Y n ∈ Knj (i)) is close to 2−r for each j = 1, 2, . . . , m and i = 1, 2, . . . , 2r.
Let U r denote the uniform distribution over {0, 1}r and V (P,Q) denote the total variation distance
between distributions P and Q.
Note that each bin Knj (i) is an agglomeration of some mass points of P nj (yn) for each j = 1, 2, . . . , m
and therefore the probability of each bin is equal to the sum of the probabilities of points yn it contains.
Recalling the definition of H∗∞(Y |X) in (4), we can write
P nj (y
n) ≤ 2−nH
∗
∞(Y |X), j = 1, 2, . . . , m. (5)
We start the construction of the bins Knj (1), Knj (2), . . . , Knj (Jj) for each j = 1, 2, . . . , m where Jj ≤
2r − 1 is the number of bins for each j. The first bin is constructed as follows. We agglomerate the
minimal number of mass points of P nj into Knj (1) as needed to make sure
P nj (Kn(1)) ≥ 2
−r − 2−s, (6)
for some s < nH∗∞(Y |X). This together with (5) shows that
P n1 (Kn(1)) < 2
−r − 2−s + 2−nH
∗
∞(Y |X), (7)
which can be simplified as
P n1 (Kn(1)) < 2
−r, (8)
because s < nH∗∞(Y |X).
Once condition (6) is met, the construction for the first bin is completed and we move on to the second
bin. This procedure can go on until either we run out of mass points or the restriction Jj ≤ 2r − 1
is violated. In the latter case, we set Jj = 2r − 1 and then collect all mass points left into the bin
Knj (Jj + 1). The former happens if the total probability of the left-over is strictly less than 2−r − 2−s
so that we can not meet the requirement (6), in other words,
P nj

 Jj⋃
i=1
Knj (i)

 > 1− 2−r + 2−s. (9)
On the other hand, we know from (8) that P nj
(⋃Jj
i=1K
n
j (i)
)
< Jj2
−r which, together with (9), implies
1− 2−r + 2−s < P nj

 Jj⋃
i=1
Knj (i)

 < Jj2−r, (10)
leading to a lower bound for the number of bins in this case
Jj > 2
r + 2r−s − 1, (11)
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5which is greater than the allowable upper-bound 2r−1. We can hence conclude that with s that satisfies
s < nH∗∞, the procedure stops only when the restriction Jj ≤ 2r − 1 is violated, and therefore, we
assume Jj = 2
r − 1 in what follows.
As specified earlier, we construct the last bin K(Jj +1) by including all the leftover mass there. We
therefore have
Knj (Jj + 1) = supp{P nj } −
Jj⋃
i=1
Knj (i), (12)
where supp{P nj } denotes the support of P nj . Since each bin has probability lower-bounded by (6), it
follows from (12) that
P nj (K(Jj + 1)) = 1−
Jj∑
i=1
P nj (K
n
j (i)) ≤ 1− Jj
(
2−r − 2−s
)
, (13)
which, after substituting Jj = 2r − 1, is simplified as
P nj (K(Jj + 1)) ≤ 2
r−s + 2−r − 2−s. (14)
So far we have constructed m× 2r bins, namely 2r bins for each P nj , j = 1, 2, . . . , m. Consider now
the deterministic mapping gn : Yn × X → {0, 1}r defined as follows:
gn(y
n, xj) = i if yn ∈ Knj (i).
This mapping requires xj because for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} the corresponding bins are disjoint.
However, we know that by using a proper channel encoding and decoding, φn and ψn, respectively, one
can decode Y n to obtain ψn(Y n) such that P (X 6= ψn(Y n)) decays exponentially. So, we can have a
deterministic function which acts only on Y n from which xj is obtained with probability exponentially
close to one. Hence our sequence of deterministic mappings is:
fn(y
n) := gn(y
n, ψn(y
n)) = i if yn ∈ Knj (i).
where j is the index of the decoded symbol, that is the j such that ψn(yn) = xj .
Now let us look at the total variation distance between P˜ nj := fn ◦ P nj and U r which is the uniform
distribution over the set {0, 1}r.
V
(
P˜ nj , U
r
)
=
2r∑
i=1
|2−r − P nj (K
n
j (i))|
=
Jj∑
i=1
(
2−r − P nj (K
n
j (i))
)
+|2−r − P nj (K
n
j (Jj + 1))| (15)
≤
Jj∑
i=1
2−s + 2−r + P nj (Kn(Jj + 1)) (16)
≤ Jj2
−s + 2−r + 2r−s + 2−r − 2−s (17)
= 2
(
2r−s + 2−r − 2−s
)
< 2
(
2r−s + 2−r
)
.
where in (15) we use (8), in (16) we use the triangle inequality and (6) and the inequality in (17)
follows from (14). To make sure that V (P˜ nj , U r) goes to zero as n→∞, we set r = nH∗∞(Y |X)− nδ
and s = nH∗∞(Y |X) − n δ2 for some 0 < δ ≤
2
3
H∗∞(Y |X). Hence we can make sure that P˜ nj and P˜ nk
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6for j 6= k are at most 2ǫ-distant in the total variation sense. This is because, for large n
V (P˜ nj , P˜
n
k ) ≤ V (P˜
n
j , U
r) + V (P˜ nk , U
r) ≤ 2ǫ.
Note that, letting EX [·] denote the expectation with respect to X , we have in general
V (PZX , PZPX) = EX
[
V
(
PZ|X(·|X), PZ
)]
,
= EX
[
V
(
PZ|X(·|X), EX [PZ|X(·|X)]
) ]
,
and hence by Jensen’s inequality
V (PZX , PZPX) ≤
∑
x
∑
x′
PX(x)PX(x
′)V
(
PZ|X(·|x), PZ|X(·|x
′)
)
We can therefore conclude that V (P˜ nj , P˜ nk ) ≤ 2ǫ for all j 6= k results in the following
V (PZnX , PZnPX) ≤ 2ǫ,
where Zn = fn(Y n). In other words, Zn and X are "2ǫ-independent" for sufficiently large n in sense
of total variation distance. Invoking [8, Lemma 2.7], the theorem follows.
This theorem implies that, unlike in the binary case studied in Theorem 1, one can have information
transfer at a positive rate while allowing perfect privacy only in the limit instead of requiring absolutely
zero privacy leakage.
IV. NON-PRIVATE INFORMATION VS. THE RATE-PRIVACY FUNCTION
Conceptually, gǫ(X ; Y ) quantifies the "largest" part of Y which carries ǫ amount of information about
X . Witsenhausen [9] defined the private information of a pair of random variables (X, Y ) as
M(X ; Y ) := max
W : X→W→Y
H(X, Y |W ). (18)
Wyner [10] defined the common information of X and Y as
CW (X ; Y ) := min
W : X→W→Y
I(X, Y ;W ). (19)
Clearly, the definition of private information in (18) implies CW (X ; Y ) = H(X, Y ) − M(X ; Y ).
Operationally, M(X ; Y ) is the rate of information that one needs to transmit over two "non-common"
channels when CW (X ; Y ) is transmitted over the common channel in order to be able to decode X and
Y with arbitrarily small error probability. This definition is not immediately useful in our setting, as it is
symmetric in X and Y . We seek an asymmetric definition for the private information that Y contains,
i.e., the rate of information contained in Y which correlates with X . Inspired by Wyner’s common
information, CW (X ; Y ), and Gács-Körner’s common information [11], denoted by CGK(X ; Y ), we
define the private information about X carried by Y as follows
CX(Y ) := min
W :X→W→Y
H(W |Y )=0
H(W ), (20)
and similar to the connection between CW (X ; Y ) and M(X ; Y ), we define DX(Y ) := H(Y )−CX(Y )
and call it the non-private information about X carried by Y . The quantity CX(Y ) as defined above
is similar to the so-called necessary conditional entropy, H(Y † X), defined by Cuff et al. [12] as
minH(W |X) where the minimum is taken over W that satisfies the same conditions as in (20).
Conceptually, we decompose the information contained in Y into two parts, namely, one part which
correlates with X , denoted by CX(Y ), and another part which has no correlation with X , denoted
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7by DX(Y ). Using the assumption H(W |Y ) = 0 in (20), we can obtain the following variational
representation for DX(Y ):
DX(Y ) = max
W :X→W→Y
H(W |Y )=0
H(Y |W ). (21)
Remark 1. Since H(W |Y ) = 0 implies that W is a function of Y , one can show that the constraint
in the above maximization, i.e., the conditions X → W → Y and H(W |Y ) = 0, is equivalent to the
"double Markov relations" X →W → Y and X → Y → W .
The so called exact common information has been introduced in [13] and shown to be related to
the problem of exact generation of a joint distribution PXY . The exact common information is defined
as the minimum rate R∗ at which an external randomness must be supplied to physically separated
agents, each responsible for one of the marginals via the private randomness, so that they are able to
exactly reproduce joint distribution PXY , in an asymptotic formulation. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the
exact common information is the minimum rate of generating W such that two independent processors
construct Xˆ and Yˆ , using W as an input of separate stochastic decoders, such that PXˆYˆ = PXY .
Processor
I
Processor
II
W
Xˆ
Yˆ
Private randomness
Private randomness
Fig. 2. Exact distribution generation.
A new quantity is then introduced in [13], so called common entropy defined by
G(X ; Y ) := min
W :X→W→Y
H(W ), (22)
and shown that R∗ = limn→∞ 1nG(X
n; Y n). Operationally, CX(Y ) is the exact common information
for a setting similar to Fig. 2, except that the common input to each processor is assumed to be a
deterministic function of Y as depicted in Fig. 3.
Processor
I
Processor
II
f(Y )
Xˆ
Yˆ
Private randomness
Private randomness
Fig. 3. Exact asymmetric distribution generation.
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1) For any (X, Y ) with joint distribution PXY , we have
I(X ; Y ) ≤ CW (X ; Y ) ≤ G(X ; Y ) ≤ CX(Y ) ≤ H(Y ). (23)
Proof. The first and the second inequalities are shown respectively in [10] and [13]. The third
one becomes clear once we examine the definitions of G(X ; Y ) and CX(Y ). Indeed, the objective
functions in the minimization are equal, however, the constraint set for CX(Y ) is a subset of the
constraint set for G(X ; Y ). The last inequality follows from the fact that Y belongs to the constraint
set as well.
Note that CX(Y ) = I(X ; Y ) implies that CW (X ; Y ) = I(X ; Y ) = CX(Y ). It is a well-known
fact that CW (X ; Y ) = I(X ; Y ) is equivalent to CGK(X ; Y ) = I(X ; Y ). Thus, CX(Y ) = I(X ; Y )
implies that CGK(X ; Y ) = CW (X ; Y ). As Wyner [10, p. 166] pointed out, these two notions of
common information are equal if and only if it is possible to write X = (X ′, V ) and Y = (Y ′, V )
such that X ′ and Y ′ are conditionally independent given V . Hence CX(Y ) = I(X ; Y ) implies
this decomposition. For the converse, suppose that we have the decomposition X = (X ′, V ) and
Y = (Y ′, V ) such that X ′ → V → Y ′. It is easy to show that for any random variable W
that satisfies X → W → Y and H(W |Y ) = 0, there exits a deterministic function f such that
V = f(W ) with probability one. Hence, on the one hand,
max
W :X→W→Y
H(W |Y )=0
H(Y |W ) ≤ H(Y |V ),
and on the other hand, since V also satisfies both conditions of W , we have
max
W :X→W→Y
H(W |Y )=0
H(Y |W ) ≥ H(Y |V ),
and therefore, DX(Y ) = H(Y |V ) = H(Y |X) and consequently CX(Y ) = I(X ; Y ).
2) CX(Y ) = 0 if and only if X⊥⊥Y .
Proof. Suppose CX(Y ) = 0. By the first inequality in (23), we have I(X ; Y ) = 0 which implies
X⊥⊥Y . Conversely, if X⊥⊥Y , then we have the following trivial Markov chain X → c → Y for
any constant c. This implies CX(Y ) = 0.
3) (Data-processing inequality) For any U such that U → X → Y , we have CU(Y ) ≤ CX(Y ).
Proof. Let W ∗ attain the CX(Y ). Hence we have the Markov chain U → X → W ∗ → Y and also
H(W ∗|Y ) = 0. It then follows by the definition that CU(Y ) ≤ H(W ∗) = CX(Y ).
B. Calculation of DX(Y )
In this section we solve the maximization in the definition of DX(Y ). To do this, we need a definition
which also appears in [12], [14] and [15].
Definition 2. Given two random variables X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y , let TX : Y → P(X ) be defined by
y → PX|Y (·|y) where P(X ) is the simplex of probability distribution on X .
To solve the maximization in the definition of DX(Y ), we need the following two lemmas from [16].
Lemma 2 ( [16]). The random variable TX (Y ) satisfies the Markov chain X → TX (Y )→ Y .
This lemma shows that the random variable TX (Y ) is basically a sufficient statistics of Y with respect
to X .
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9Lemma 3 ( [16]). Let X, Y and V form a Markov chain, X → V → Y and also H(V |Y ) = 0. Then
there exists a deterministic function g, such that TX (Y ) = g(V ) with probability one.
This lemma together with Lemma 2 implies that TX (Y ) is the minimal sufficient statistics of Y with
respect to X , i.e., all other sufficient statistics of Y are a function of TX (Y ).
The following theorem shows that TX (Y ) solves the minimization in the definition of CX(Y ).
Theorem 3. For any pair of random variables (X, Y ) with joint distribution PXY , we have
DX(Y ) = H(Y )−H(T
X (Y )).
Proof. Since H(Y |W ) = H(Y ) − H(W ) for all W that satisfies the condition H(W |Y ) = 0, we
will show that TX (Y ) minimizes H(W ) over all W that satisfies Markov chain X → W → Y and
H(W |Y ) = 0. Note that Lemma 2 shows that TX (Y ) belongs to the constraint set of the maximization
in the theorem and Lemma 3 shows that TX (Y ) has the smallest entropy among all the random variables
in the constraint set. These two lemmas therefore together imply that H(Y |W ) attains its maximum
value at W = TX (Y ).
As mentioned before, CX(Y ) ≤ H(Y ). From the previous theorem we can now give the condition
under which CX(Y ) = H(Y ). Assume that Y = {y1, y2, . . . , ym}.
Lemma 4. CX(Y ) = H(Y ) if and only if there exists no y1, y2 ∈ Y such that PX|Y (·|y1) = PX|Y (·|y2).
Proof. From Theorem 3, it is easy to see that if for all y ∈ Y , PX|Y (·|y) are different, then CX(Y ) =
H(Y ). Conversely, suppose that W ∗ attains CX(Y ) and also suppose H(W ∗) = H(Y ). Assume that
there exist y1 and y2 such that PX|Y (·|y1) = PX|Y (·|y2). Then define a new random variable Y˜ which
takes on values on set {y′, y3, . . . , ym} with probabilities (PY (y1) +PY (y2), PY (y3), . . . , PY (ym)). This
random variable satisfies the conditions X → Y˜ → Y and H(Y˜ |Y ) = 0. However, H(Y˜ ) < H(Y ) =
H(W ∗) which contradicts the minimality of W ∗.
C. Connecting DX(Y ) with g0(X ; Y )
Considering the definition of CX(Y ), one can loosely say that all the information contained in Y
which is correlated with X is concentrated on TX (Y ), and therefore DX(Y ) represents the amount of
information contained in Y and not correlated with X . This suggests that DX(Y ) is equal to g0(X ; Y ).
In what follows, we study two different cases where DX(Y ) = g0(X ; Y ). First we look at the case when
CX(Y ) = I(X ; Y ). We previously showed that this happens if and only if there exists the decomposition
X = (X ′, V ) and Y = (Y ′, V ) such that Y ′ is conditionally independent of X ′ given V . In this case,
DX(Y ) = H(Y |X). It is straightforward to show that in this case we have g0(X ; Y ) ≤ H(Y ′|V ). To
see this, assume otherwise, that is, suppose that there exists a random variable, say, Z such that Z⊥⊥X
and also I(Y ;Z) > H(Y ′|V ). Since
I(Y ;Z) = I(Y ′, V ;Z) = I(V ;Z) + I(Y ′;Z|V ),
the assumption I(Y ;Z) > H(Y ′|V ) implies
I(V ;Z) > H(Y ′|V, Z).
This contradicts our assumption that Z⊥⊥X = (X ′, V ). Hence we conclude that g0(X ; Y ) ≤ H(Y ′|V ).
One special case of this decomposition is the case studied by Wyner [10] where X ′, Y ′ and V are
mutually independent. Consider now the following deterministic function f acting on Y = (Y ′, V ),
defined by f(y) = (y′, 0). Then we set Z = f(Y ) and hence the privacy filter is PY ′|Y . By construction
we have Z⊥⊥(V,X ′) and hence Z⊥⊥X . Note that I(Y ;Z) = H(Z) = H(Y ′). Since we showed above
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that g0(X ; Y ) ≤ H(Y ′|V ) and since in this special case H(Y ′|V ) = H(Y ′), one can conclude that
g0(X ; Y ) = H(Y
′). Therefore, in this case the equality DX(Y ) = g0(X ; Y ) holds.
The second setting that we examine is the binary case. From Theorem 1 we know that g0(X ; Y ) = 0
for any binary correlated X and Y .
Suppose X = Y = {0, 1}, Y ∼ Bernoulli(p), PX|Y (·|0) = Bernoulli(α) and PX|Y (·|1) = Bernoulli(β).
The condition H(W |Y ) = 0 implies that there exists a deterministic function f : Y → W with
|W| ≤ |Y| such that W = f(Y ) and therefore, PW |Y (w|y) = 1{w=f(y)}. The only possible cases for
PW |Y are
PW |Y =
[
0 1
1 0
]
and
PW |Y =
[
1 0
0 1
]
where each column corresponds to a value of Y ∈ {0, 1}. Thus W ∼ Bernoulli(p) or W ∼ Bernoulli(1−
p). In either case, H(W ) = H(Y ). Hence, CX(Y ) = H(Y ), i.e., DX(Y ) = 0 and thus g0(X ; Y ) =
DX(Y ) = 0 which is what we wanted to show. Note that this argument does not depend on the
cardinality of X . In other words, it is impossible to send any information at non-zero rate with zero
privacy leakage when |Y| = 2 which is a restatement of Lemma 1.
Although the relation DX(Y ) = g0(X ; Y ) holds for the two cases described above, in the following
example we have g0(X ; Y ) > DX(Y ).
Example 1. Consider X distributed according to Bernoulli(p) and the binary erasure channel PY |X with
erasure probability δ. The output alphabet is therefore ternary {0, e, 1} where e denotes the erasure.
Letting Z = f(Y ) where f maps Y = 1 and Y = 0 to 1 and e to 0, we conclude that g0(X ; Y ) ≥ h(δ).
On the other hand, H(Y |X) = h(δ) which implies that g0(X ; Y ) = h(δ). Furthermore, Lemma 4
implies that CX(Y ) = H(Y ) and thus DX(Y ) = 0. Therefore, although DX(Y ) = 0, we can extract
independent information of X from Y with positive rate.
In general, one can ask under what condition on PXY does the relation DX(Y ) = g0(X ; Y ) hold?
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we defined a new privacy-utility tradeoff where both privacy and utility are measured in
terms of mutual information. The resulting rate-privacy function characterizes the best utility when the
privacy leakage is required to be less than ǫ. For the case when ǫ = 0 (perfect privacy) we calculated
the rate-privacy function for the binary case. We also introduced a new quantity which quantifies the
private information contained in the observable data and examined the connection between this quantity
and the rate-privacy function.
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